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HUE AND CRY IN THE COUNTING-HOUSE:
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANK
SECRECY ACT
Jonathan J. Rusch*
One of the stranger vicissitudes in our society is the extent to which cash
has become more important as a medium of exchange in illegal transactions
than in legal transactions. While "cash is a highly suitable means of pay-
ment for many transactions,"' it is not the preferred method of payment by
Americans for legitimate transactions. 2 In contrast, cash is virtually indis-
pensable for a wide range of illegal activities, including drug trafficking, ille-
gal gambling, prostitution, loansharking, bribery, extortion, tax evasion, and
other financial offenses.3 Unlike other financial instruments, cash freely cir-
culates throughout the population, is customarily used and accepted as a
medium of exchange, and does not routinely return to the issuing institution.
Law enforcement authorities, therefore, encounter substantial difficulties in
reconstructing audit trails when cash is used in illegal activities.
Those difficulties are compounded by the sheer volume of cash that is
traceable to some form of illegal activity. According to a 1986 survey com-
missioned by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System:
* United States Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of
the Treasury or any other federal department or agency.
1. Changes in the Use of Transaction Accounts and Cash from 1984 to 1986, 73 Fed. Res.
Bull. 179, 186 (1987) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Study]. The Federal Reserve Study reports
the results of a survey, commissioned in 1986 by the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, to determine how various changes, such as the greater availability of automated
teller machines, have affected the payment practices of American families. Id. at 179.
2. According to the Federal Reserve Study, main checking accounts constituted the most
prevalent methods of payment for aggregate household expenditures (39%). Id. at 180 (Table
1). Cash constituted 34% of such expenditures, while credit cards and savings or money mar-
ket accounts each constituted only 8% of such expenditures. Id. Moreover, the survey found
that the usage rate (i.e., turnover) of cash declined between 1984 and 1986, perhaps in response
to the lowering of interest rates during that period. Id. at 189-90.
3. See, e.g., White Collar Crime (Money Laundering): Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1986) (statement of William F. Weld, U.S.
Attorney for the District of Massachusetts); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED
CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH
CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING
7-13, 29-49 (1984) [hereinafter PCOC REPORT].
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[A]dult U.S. residents in the aggregate held about $20 billion in
cash, which they used for transactions. This total amounted to
about 11 percent of the stock of currency or coin in circulation
outside banks, which was $177.4 billion at the time of the survey.
Thus, in 1986 as in 1984, a large percentage of the U.S. currency
stock was apparently held in unreported hoards, "underground"
for illegitimate purposes, or offshore.4
Criminals who supervise large-scale illegal activities encounter an array of
problems in handling large quantities of cash. Purveyors of illegal goods and
services, such as drug trafficking, illegal gambling, and prostitution, accumu-
late large quantities of small-denomination bills from retail sales. Some sup-
pliers of vital raw materials for illegal drug production may be unwilling to
accept payment in these small-denomination bills.5 Other criminals may be
willing to accept cash, but want it converted into a more portable and con-
cealable form. Even if the criminal is holding the currency for his own use,
the sheer bulk of that currency may impel him to convert it into some other
form that can be concealed more readily from detection by law enforcement
authorities and disguised to appear legitimate. 6 To effect that concealment
and disguise, the criminal has only two principal alternatives: to introduce
the cash into a financial institution 7 for deposit, transfer, or exchange; or to
4. Federal Reserve Study, supra note 1, at 191.
5. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND
HEROIN TRAFFICKING 206 (1985) (testimony of Leroy Barnes, convicted heroin trafficker).
Different types of illegal activities may involve different denominations of bills received from
purchasers. One money launderer who had been active in the Miami area testified in 1986 that
he and his associates referred to $5 and $10 bills as "marijuana money" and $20, $50, and $100
bills as "cocaine money." Tax Evasion, Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering as They In-
volve Financial Institutions: Hearings on H.R. 1367, H.R. 1474, H.R. 1945, H.R. 2785, H.R.
3892, H.R. 4280, and H.R. 4573 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 79, 85 (1986) [hereinafter Tax Evasion Hearings] (testimony of Herb Friedberg,
former money launderer).
6. A commonly accepted definition of money laundering is "the process by which one
conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that
income to make it appear legitimate." PCOC REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (footnote omitted).
One example of the need to reduce the bulk of currency from illegal activities concerned a
money laundering operation that made use of several Atlantic City casinos. At one casino,
money launderers deposited throughout the day a total of $1,187,450 in small-denomination
bills. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND GAM-
BLING: RECORD OF HEARING VII 591 (1985) (testimony of Martin Molod, Revenue Agent,
Internal Revenue Service). According to calculations based on data from the Bureau of En-
graving and Printing, that deposit weighed approximately 280 pounds and measured 5.81 cu-
bic feet. Id. at 593. After gambling with these funds for a time, the launderers withdrew
$800,000 in $100 bills. Id. at 594. This withdrawal is estimated to have weighed 16 pounds
and to have measured one-third of a cubic foot. Id. at 594-95.
7. The term "financial institution" includes not only financial institutions that engage in
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transport the cash out of the country for similar purposes at a foreign finan-
cial institution.
I. BANK SECRECY ACT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
To deal with concealment and disguise of currency, Congress passed legis-
lation in 1970 that has become commonly known as the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA).8 The BSA vests substantial authority in the Department of the
Treasury (Treasury) to require the filing of reports and the maintenance of
records that have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings.9 The BSA and the implementing regulations
that the Treasury promulgated thereunder require the routine filing of four
types of reports:
1. The Currency Transaction Report (CTR). A financial institution
other than a casino must file a CTR (also known as Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) Form 4789) for "each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or
other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution which
involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000."' Banks" may
unilaterally exempt limited types of currency transactions by certain speci-
fied categories of customers (such as deposits or withdrawals by retail sellers
of certain goods and services) from the CTR reporting requirements, and
may apply to the IRS for additional authority to exempt other types of busi-
nesses and transactions.
1 2
banking services, but also other financial institutions, such as casinos and currency exchanges,
that carry out functions similar or related to those offered by the banking community. See
Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1982), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2)(T)
(West Supp. 1987) [hereinafter BSA]; 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(g) (1987).
8. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d,
1829b, 1951-1959 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5324 (1982 & Supp. III
1985), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5312(a)(2)(T), (u)(5), 5316(a)(1)-(2), 5316(d), 5317(b)-(c),
5318(a)-(f), 5321(a)(1), (4)-(6), 5321 (b)-(d), 5322(a)-(c), 5323(a)-(d), 5324 (West Supp. 1987)).
9. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951 (1982); 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1982).
10. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1987); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1982). The regulations
define a "transaction in currency" as "[a] transaction involving the physical transfer of cur-
rency from one person to another." 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(o) (1987). A transaction that involves
a transfer of funds by means of some written order, but that does not include the physical
transfer of currency, is not a "transaction in currency" under the BSA. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(o)
(1987).
11. The regulations define the term "bank" to include commercial banks or trust compa-
nies, private banks, savings and loan or building and loan associations, thrifts, credit unions,
banks organized under foreign law, Edge Act corporations, and other organizations chartered
under state banking laws and subject to supervision by state bank supervisory agencies. 31
C.F.R. § 103.1 1(a) (1987). Under the regulations, a "bank" is one type of financial institution
that must comply with the CTR reporting requirements. See id § 103.11(g)(1).
12. See id. § 103.22(b)(2), 103.22(d)-(e).
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2. The Currency Transaction Report by Casinos (CTRC). A casino must
file a CTRC (also known as IRS Form 8362) for transactions similar to those
for which other financial institutions must file CTR's.'
3
3. The Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary
Instruments (CMIR). A person must file a CMIR (also known as Customs
Form 4790) if he (1) "physically transports, mails, or ships, or causes to be
physically transported, mailed, or shipped, . . . currency or other monetary
instruments in an aggregate amount exceeding $10,000 on any one occa-
sion," whether that transportation is into or out of the United States;14 or
(2) if he receives, in the U.S., currency or other monetary instruments in an
aggregate amount exceeding $10,000 that have come from outside the
United States and on which no CMIR was filed.' 5
4. The Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR). A per-
son subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, including a U.S. citizen
residing abroad, 6 must file an FBAR (also known as Treasury Form TDF
90-22.1) if that person had, at any time during the year, "a financial interest
in, or signature or other authority over," one or more bank accounts, securi-
ties accounts, or other financial accounts in foreign countries, and the aggre-
gate value of those accounts exceeded $10,000.17
In addition, the Treasury can impose special reporting requirements on
domestic financial institutions, when it deems it appropriate, to obtain infor-
mation on certain transactions between those institutions and foreign finan-
cial agencies.'8 Finally, the BSA and the regulations require financial
institutions to maintain a variety of records, such as copies of signature
cards, bank statements, and checks drawn for more than $100,'9 for a five-
year period.2° Records required to be kept under the BSA, unlike the BSA
reports, generally may be inspected or reviewed by law enforcement authori-
ties only for the purpose of assuring compliance with the BSA's require-
ments; in other cases, the authorities must obtain legal process or comply
with other legal provisions.2
13. Id. § 103.22(a)(2) (1987); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1982).
14. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) (1987); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
15. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5316(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
16. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1987).
17. See id.; Department of the Treasury, Form TDF 90-22. 1, Report of Foreign Bank and
Financial Accounts (Sept. 1986 ed.).
18. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(a) (1987). Pursuant to this authority, the Department of the
Treasury (Treasury) may obtain information on checks, drafts, wire transfers, loans, commer-
cial paper, stocks, and bonds involved in transactions with foreign financial agencies. Id.
§ 103.25(b).
19. Id. § 103.34(b)(1)-(3).
20. Id. § 103.38(d).
21. See id. § 103.51; H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970), reprinted in 1970
[Vol. 37:465
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II. THE BANK SECRECY ACT'S UTILITY IN
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
The BSA reports have proved highly useful for civil and criminal law en-
forcement purposes. Particularly in recent years, these reports have pro-
vided law enforcement authorities with investigative leads, information that
corroborates other sources of information about criminal activities, and even
probative evidence in federal criminal cases. Perhaps the most prominent
example of the reports' utility is United States v. Badalamenti,2 which in-
volved smuggling of substantial quantities of heroin into the United States
by members of Italian and American organized criminal groups. In the
course of their investigation of the heroin trafficking, federal authorities dis-
covered a number of BSA reports that reflected large cash transactions by a
Swiss national, Franco Della Torre, with stockbrokers in New York.
2 3
These reports eventually led to the discovery of an extensive money launder-
ing operation that involved the transfer of tens of millions of dollars through
investment houses and banks in New York City to financial institutions in
Switzerland and Italy.24 A recent study by the Treasury described the out-
come of Badalamenti:
Twenty defendants, who were prosecuted in Federal court in
New York for their involvement in the heroin network and money
laundering, were convicted of various charges, including heroin
conspiracy, racketeering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. All re-
ceived prison sentences, and fifteen of the defendants received
sentences ranging from fifteen to forty-five years. In addition,
Della Torre was convicted and imprisoned by Swiss authorities for
violations of Swiss law relating to his money laundering
activities.2"
The government has also made substantial use of the BSA to prosecute a
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4394, 4395. In some instances, the Treasury requires
financial institutions to maintain certain types of information, such as the names, addresses,
and account numbers of those account holders from whom the financial institution has been
unable to obtain a taxpayer identification number, and make that information available to it
upon request. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22(g) (list of customers exempted from reporting require-
ments), 103.34(a)(1), 103.35(a)(1), 103.36(a) (1987).
22. SS 84 Cr. 236 (PNL) (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 87-1303 (2d Cir. June 29,
1987). This case has become known informally as the "Pizza Connection" case. See, e.g.,
PCOC REPORT, supra note 3, at 31-32.
23. United States v. Badalamenti, SS 84 Cr. 236 (PNL) (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No.
87-1303 (2d Cir. June 29, 1987).
24. Id.
25. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE BANK SECRECY
ACT: THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN BRANCHES OF DOMESTIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 21
(1987).
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number of leading money launderers in the United States and abroad. In
recent years, for example, the government has successfully prosecuted: Isaac
Kattan-Kassin, whose money laundering organization handled gross pro-
ceeds estimated at $200 million to $250 million per year;26 Ramon Milian-
Rodriguez, who transported approximately $146 million in cash from the
United States to Panama over a nine-month period;2" Eduardo Orozco-
Prada, whose money laundering organization laundered more than $150
million over a four-year period;2" and Barbara Mouzin, who masterminded
and operated a large West Coast money laundering business for cocaine
traffickers.29
In some instances, even a single CTR can provide significant leads for
criminal investigators. In one case, the IRS analyzed a CTR and determined
that the individual listed on the CTR had not filed a tax return. 30 Subse-
quent investigation disclosed the existence of a massive heroin distribution
and money laundering organization, operating primarily throughout south-
ern California, which provided false information to the financial institutions
that filed CTR's on their transactions.3' Eventually, the IRS arrested at
least a dozen persons associated with the organization, seized at least $12
million in currency at various domestic banks, and charged the organization
with income tax evasion involving $27 million in income over a three-year
period.32
26. Tax Evasion Hearings, supra note 5, at 797 (testimony of Alwin C. Coward, Acting
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration, Depart-
ment of Justice); see also PCOC REPORT, supra note 3, at 40-43. Kattan-Kassin was eventu-
ally prosecuted for numerous BSA violations, and cooperated with the federal government.
See United States v. Kattan-Kassin, No. 81-5474, slip op. (11th Cir. June 3, 1983); United
States v. Kattan-Kassin, 696 F.2d 893 (11th Cir. 1983).
27. See United States v. Milian-Rodriguez, 828 F.2d 679, 680 (11th Cir. 1987). When he
was apprehended on May 4, 1983, Milian-Rodriguez was about to fly nearly $5.5 million in
U.S. currency to Panama in his Lear Jet. Id. Milian-Rodriguez was subsequently convicted
on 61 counts of racketeering, drug offenses, and BSA violations. Id at 681.
28. See United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1078 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 845 (1984); PCOC REPORT, supra note 3, at 35-36. Orozco-Prada was convicted on six
counts of drug offenses, conspiracy, false statements, and BSA violations, and was sentenced to
eight years' imprisonment and a fine of $1,035,000. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1079.
29. See United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 685 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 574
(1986). Mouzin was convicted of 19 separate offenses, including BSA violations, conspiracy,
drug offenses, and racketeering, and was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment with a lifetime
special parole term. Id. The co-leader of her organization was convicted on eight counts of
the same indictment, and was sentenced to 29 years of imprisonment with a lifetime special
parole. Id.
30. See Tax Evasion Hearings, supra note 5, at 122-24 (testimony of Richard C. Was-
senaar, Assistant Commissioner for Criminal Investigation, IRS).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Although many of the examples cited above involve large-scale money
laundering for drug traffickers, BSA reports also are highly useful in identi-
fying or proving other types of financial crimes. In one recent case, for ex-
ample, analysis of reports filed by a federally insured financial institution
provided a number of leads to the disposition of tens of millions of dollars
that had been embezzled from the financial institution through such devices
as illegal loans. In another recent case, federal investigators discovered that
a husband and wife had failed to file a CMIR form for $125,000 in cash that
they took out of the United States. Further investigation determined that
the wife had embezzled millions of dollars from a savings and loan associa-
tion in Texas where she had been employed.
These examples amply demonstrate the substantial utility of BSA reports.
Unlike various forms of compulsory process, such as grand jury subpoenas
or judicial orders, which are used only after the initiation of a criminal inves-
tigation, the reports provide a constant stream of data on large domestic and
international movements of cash and furnish the basis for either initiating or
expanding an investigation. Moreover, the process for filing these reports
ensures that law enforcement agents obtain valuable information on suspi-
cious movements of cash in a more timely and less cumbersome fashion than
compulsory process.33
33. The legislative history of the BSA makes clear that Congress created the statute's
reporting requirements in part to aid law enforcement authorities in their efforts to obtain
information about financial transactions and bank accounts in foreign jurisdictions, particu-
larly those jurisdictions with stringent provisions to assure the secrecy of banking transactions.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4394, 4397. At that time, the legal process in those jurisdictions for obtaining
information on such transactions or accounts was "time consuming and ofttimes fruitless." Id.
Since then, the development of formal and informal international arrangements with various
foreign countries, as well as the expansion of statutory authority to obtain evidence from
abroad, has alleviated some of the problems for federal law enforcement authorities. See gen-
erally Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and the Regulations Implementing the Bank
Secrecy Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation
and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) (statement of William F. Weld, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice) [hereinafter Money Laundering Hearings]; SECRETARY OF THE TREAS-
URY, supra note 25, at 57-71. The process for obtaining admissible evidence from abroad for
use in federal criminal proceedings is still generally elaborate and time consuming. In con-
trast, BSA reports (other than the FBAR form) generally must be filed no later than 15 days
after a reportable transaction or transportation has occurred, and the reports are converted to
computer-queriable data within a reasonable span of time thereafter. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.26
(1987).
The most obvious limitation on the utility of BSA reports, of course, is the fact that they
record only those data specified in the regulations and on the reports. Other highly useful
information, such as the identities of persons associated with a foreign bank account or trans-
action, may not be available in those reports. Prosecutors must therefore continue to seek
information directly from foreign jurisdictions, as full-fledged money laundering operations
1988]
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Recognition of the BSA's utility has helped to spur the federal govern-
ment to enforce the BSA's requirements with increasing vigor. In the past
five years, for example, the IRS Criminal Investigation Division has steadily
increased the number of investigations initiated34 and prosecutions recom-
mended for criminal violations of the BSA. During that same period, the
numbers of indictments and convictions for those violations also have in-
creased." In the past three years, the United States Customs Service, which
exercises the Treasury's authority under the BSA to seize currency and mon-
almost always involve the use of foreign banks. See Tax Evasion Hearings, supra note 5, at 126
(testimony of Richard C. Wassenaar, Assistant Commissioner for Criminal Investigation,
IRS).
In their efforts to obtain information from foreign jurisdictions more swiftly, federal prose-
cutors have made use of two techniques that have proved more controversial than the BSA.
The first technique involves the issuance of a subpoena to a domestic subsidiary of a foreign
corporation to obtain records in the custody of the foreign corporation. Foreign corporations
whose records have been subpoenaed in this manner frequently resist production of the records
on the ground that production would violate the secrecy laws of their country. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1386-89 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); see also Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles
et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 200 (1958) (efforts by Swiss holding company
to resist U.S. pretrial production order of bank records). While courts have frequently sup-
ported the government's efforts, that support is not without limits. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case,
825 F.2d 494, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); In re Arawak Trust Co. (Cayman), 489 F.
Supp. 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
The second technique involves the issuance of grand jury subpoenas directing a person to
sign a form consenting to the disclosure of bank records in a foreign country. Several circuits
have upheld the use of these "consent directives." See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 826 F.2d
1166, 1170-71 (2d Cir. 1987); In re United States Grand Jury Proceedings (Cid), 767 F.2d
1131, 1132-33 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1033-36 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818-19 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984).
But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 793 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
fifth amendment applicable to consent directive); In re N.D.N.Y. Grand Jury Subpoena 86-
0351-S, 811 F.2d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1987) (relying on court's supervisory power to preclude
use of consent directive that failed to indicate the district court had compelled consent). The
Supreme Court may soon decide whether consent directives violate the privilege against self-
incrimination. See In re Grand Jury 84-2, No. 86-2663, slip op. (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1987),
petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3055 (U.S. May 1, 1987) (No. 86-1753). In any event,
neither of these techniques is likely to produce useful information as quickly as BSA reports do
on a routine basis.
34. The BSA regulations delegate to the IRS the authority to investigate all criminal vio-
lations of the BSA (except for CMIR violations in 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1987)), and to the
United States Customs Service the authority to investigate criminal CMIR violations. 31
C.F.R. § 103.46(c) (1987).
35. The following table sets forth statistics prepared by the IRS Criminal Investigation
Division on their criminal investigations of BSA violations from Fiscal Year (FY) 1982
through FY 1987 (ending September 30, 1987):
[Vol. 37:465
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etary instruments transported without being reported on CMIR forms,3 6 has
consistently increased its seizures of currency and monetary instruments
under all applicable federal statutes, including the BSA.37 In addition, since
June of 1985, the Treasury has imposed thirty-six civil money penalties, to-
taling nearly $16 million, against financial institutions for civil violations of
the BSA. as
III. COMBATTING EVASION TECHNIQUES
The increased enforcement of the BSA, coupled with substantial increases
in the maximum criminal and civil sanctions for violations of the BSA,39 has
FY FY FY FY FY FY
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Investigations
Initiated 126 171 238 338 354 400
Prosecution
Recommendations 55 119 143 174 275 256
Indictments 29 103 102 144 204 236
Convictions 25 61 73 91 108 153
From FY82 to FY85, the percentage of these investigations that involved narcotics ranged
from 36.3% to 51.7%. See Tax Evasion Hearings, supra note 5, at 115-16 (testimony of Rich-
ard C. Wassenaar, Assistant Commissioner for Criminal Investigation, IRS). In addition,
since the enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, § 1354, 100 Stat.
3207, 3207-22 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1987)),
which created a new offense under the BSA for structuring currency transactions to evade the
CTR reporting requirement, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp. 1987), there have been six indict-
ments and two convictions for structuring violations as of the date of this writing. See infra
notes 50-60 and accompanying text (discussing 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324).
36. See 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1982), as amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(b)-(c) (West Supp.
1987); 31 C.F.R. § 103.50 (1987).
37. From 1984 to 1986, the Customs Service increased the total of all currency and mone-
tary instrument seizures from $67.7 million to $96.1 million. Federal Accounting of Seized
Cash in Federal Agencies. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal Spending, Budget, and
Accounting of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1987)
(testimony of William von Raab, Commissioner of Customs). Seizures pertaining directly to
BSA violations constitute a significant portion of these totals. For example, in one special
operation to detect unreported outbound currency in south Florida, "Operation Buckstop,"
the Customs Service seized more than $7 million in one three-week period. Id.
38. Department of the Treasury statistics (compiled by the author).
39. Section 1357(g) of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA), Pub. L. No.
99-570, § 1357(g), 100 Stat. 3207-18, 3207-26, amended the BSA, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat.
1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-24 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by 31 U.S.C.A.
§§ 5312(a)(2)(T), (u)(5), 5316(a)(1)-(2), 5316(d), 5317(b)-(c), 5318(a)-(f), 5321(a)(1), (4)-(6),
5321(b)-(d), 5322(a)-(c), 5323(a)-(d), 5324 (West Supp. 1987)), to elevate the maximum pen-
alty for criminal violation of the BSA to 10 years' imprisonment for violations committed
while violating another federal law or as part of a pattern of any illegal activity involving more
than $100,000 in a 12-month period. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322(b) (West Supp. 1987) (amending 31
U.S.C. § 5322(b) (1982)). Section 1357(b) of the MLCA, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1357(b), 100
19881
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helped to elicit two reactions from those who must comply with the statute's
provisions. Legitimate financial institutions, which have every interest in
full compliance with the BSA, have dramatically increased the number of
BSA reports that they are filing each year. CTR filings alone have increased
steadily from 707,000 in 1984 to 3.7 million in 1986, and in 1987, are pro-
jected to exceed 5 million.' Professional money launderers 4, have no inter-
est in disclosing their association with large cash transactions, and,
therefore, have developed various means to evade the BSA's reporting
requirements.
One of the more commonly used evasion techniques, known as the "struc-
turing" of transactions involves the conduct of multiple cash transactions
(such as deposits or purchases of cashier's checks or money orders) in
amounts that total more than $10,000, but individually do not exceed the
$10,000 threshold for CTR reports, for the express purpose of evading the
CTR requirement. 42 The conduct of structured transactions, at multiple
branches of the same financial institution or at multiple institutions, may
prevent the filing of BSA reports on transactions that otherwise would be
Stat. 3207-18, 3207-25, also amended the BSA to increase the maximum civil penalty for basic
violations of the BSA from $10,000 to "the greater of the amount (not to exceed $100,000)
involved in the transaction or $25,000." 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (amending 31 U.S.C.
§ 5321(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985)). Similarly, § 1357(c) of the MLCA, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§ 1357(c), 100 Stat. 3207-18, 3207-25, established a comparable maximum civil penalty for
violations involving foreign financial agency transactions. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i). In
addition, § 1357(a) of the MLCA, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1357(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18, 3207-25,
established a maximum civil penalty for violations of 31 U.S.C. § 5324, of the amount of cur-
rency or monetary instruments involved in the transaction. Id. § 5321(a)(4).
Each of the foregoing civil penalties pertains only to those who "willfully violat[e]" the
BSA. See id. § 5321(a)(1). Section 1357(d) of the MLCA, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1357(d), 100
Stat. 3207-18, 3207-26, also authorizes the imposition of a civil money penalty for a negligent
violation of the BSA's reporting provisions or the regulations thereunder. Id. § 5321(a)(6).
Finally, § 1366(a) of the MLCA, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1366(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18, 3207-35 to
-39 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-82 (Supp. IV 1986)), added a new section to the federal
criminal code that permits civil forfeiture of coin, currency, or monetary instruments or any
interest in other property, including a deposit in a financial institution, that is traceable to coin
or currency involved in a transaction or attempted transaction that would violate the CTR or
structuring provisions of the BSA. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
40. Department of the Treasury statistics (compiled by the author).
41. The BSA regulations define the term "financial institution" to include not only institu-
tions chartered by federal or state banking regulatory agencies, but also any person engaged in
currency dealing, 31 C.F.R. § 103.1 l(g)(3) (1987), or "the business of transmitting funds." Id.
§ 103.11(g)(5) (1987). Federal prosecutors sometimes have relied on the latter definitions to
hold individual money launderers, or their organizations, liable as financial institutions for
failing to comply with the BSA. See, e.g., United States v. Goldberg, 756 F.2d 949, 954 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985).
42. See, e.g., Tax Evasion Hearings, supra note 5, passim.
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reportable transactions, and, therefore, may substantially reduce the likeli-
hood of detection by law enforcement authorities.
Federal authorities have prosecuted financial institutions and individuals
for structuring transactions to evade the BSA reporting requirements. In
some instances, these efforts have been successful. For example, in United
States v. Heyman,43 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that an account executive at a brokerage was criminally liable for
conducting structured transactions that caused the brokerage to fail to file
CTR's. In other instances, however, courts, beginning with the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Anzalone, 4
reversed convictions on various grounds, holding that the structuring of
transactions was not a federal crime.45
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,46 Congress created three new cate-
gories of federal offenses that carry substantial penalties for activities related
to money laundering. Section 1956 of title 18 of the United States Code
prohibits money laundering that involves the proceeds of certain specified
unlawful activities.47 Section 1957 of title 18 prohibits engaging in monetary
transactions involving property derived from certain specified unlawful ac-
tivities.48 Although neither of these sections is part of the BSA, several of
the operative terms in these sections refer to, or are defined with reference to,
43. 794 F.2d 788, 791-93 (2d Cir.) (affirming conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b), 371
(1982) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a), 5322 (1982)), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 585 (1986); see also
United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 645-47 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1982)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706
F.2d 1092, 1096-1101 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (affirming conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982)).
44. 766 F.2d 676, 680-83 (1st Cir. 1985).
45. See United States v. Gimbel, No. 86-1808, slip op. at 12 (7th Cir. Aug. 6, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file) (reversing conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b), 1001,
1341, 1343 (1982)); United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244, 247 (8th Cir. 1986) (reversing
conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001 (1982)); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 760 (9th
Cir. 1986) (reversing conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1001, 1343 (1982)); United States
v. Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559, 1561-63 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (reversing conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1982)); Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 680-83 (reversing conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001
(1982) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5322 (1982)).
46. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-22 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324
(West Supp. 1987)).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. IV 1986). A violation of this section constitutes a criminal
offense punishable by a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property,
funds, or monetary instruments involved in the transaction (whichever is greater), or imprison-
ment for not more than 20 years, or both. Id. § 1956(a)(l)-(2). In addition, the government
can seek "a civil penalty of not more than the greater of (1) the value of property, funds, or
monetary instruments involved in the transaction; or (2) $10,000." Id. § 1956(b).
48. Id. § 1957. A violation of this section constitutes a criminal offense punishable by "a
fine under title 18 .... or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both." Id. § 1957(a).
An alternative fine may be imposed of not more than twice the amount of the criminally
derived property involved in the transaction. Id. § 1957(b)(2).
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the BSA.4 9
In addition, Congress enacted section 5324 of title 31 of the United States
Code to close the loophole created by Anzalone and its progeny. ° Section
5324 amends the BSA to prohibit the structuring of transactions.5 It makes
it both a civil and a criminal violation of the BSA to commit any of the
following acts for the purpose of evading the CTR reporting requirement:
1. Cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file
a required CTR;
52
2. Cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a
required CTR that contains a material omission or misstatement of fact;53 or
3. Structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in
structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial
institutions.
5 4
The legislative history of section 5324 makes clear that Congress unam-
biguously intended to negate judicial decisions such as Anzalone and to cod-
ify judicial decisions such as United States v. Tobon-Builes," which held
individuals liable for structuring transactions to evade the CTR reporting
requirement. As stated in the legislative history, section 5324 would "ex-
pressly" subject "to potential liability a person who causes or attempts to
49. Section 1956 makes it an offense for a person to conduct a financial transaction involv-
ing the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, if he knows "that the transaction is designed in
whole or in part ... to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law."
Id. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(ii). Section 1956 also makes it an offense for a person to transport a mone-
tary instrument or funds into or out of the United States, if he knows "that the monetary
instrument or funds involved in the transportation represent the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity and know[s] that such transportation is designed in whole or in part ... to
avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law." Id. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Finally, both §§ 1956 and 1957 define the terms "monetary instruments" and "financial insti-
tution," either implicitly or explicitly with reference to the BSA and the regulations thereun-
der. See id. §§ 1956(c)(5)-(6), 1957(f)(1).
50. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-22 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324
(West Supp. 1987)).
51. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp. 1987).
52. Id. § 5324(1).
53. Id. § 5324(2).
54. Id. § 5324(3). A willful violation of any of the three provisions of § 5324 constitutes a
criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more
than $250,000, or both. Id. § 5322(a). If the violation is committed while violating another
federal law or "as part of a pattern of any illegal activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-
month period," the maximum punishment may be increased to imprisonment for not more
than 10 years, or a $500,000 fine, or both, Id. § 5322(b). A willful violation of any of the three
provisions of § 5324 may also constitute a civil violation for which the Treasury may impose a
civil money penalty that may not exceed the amount of the coins, currency, or other monetary
instruments involved in the transaction. Id. § 5321(a)(4).
55. 706 F.2d 1092, 1094-95 (1lth Cir. 1983).
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cause a financial institution to fail to file a required report or who causes a
financial institution to file a required report that contains material omissions
or misstatements of fact."' 56 Additionally, it "would create the offense of
structuring a transaction to evade the reporting requirements, without re-
gard for whether an individual transaction is, itself, reportable under the
Bank Secrecy Act."57 As an example, the Senate Judiciary Committee re-
port noted:
[A] person who converts $18,000 in currency to cashier's checks by
purchasing two $9,000 cashier's checks at two different banks or
on two different days with the specific intent that the participating
bank or banks not be required to file Currency Transaction Re-
ports for those transactions, would be subject to potential civil and
criminal liability.58
These reports, and the subsequent floor debates on the legislation,59 leave no
doubt that Congress intended "to cover the splitting up of more than
$10,000 in cash into multiple transactions, each totalling less than $10,000,
at the same or different banks or branches of the same bank and on the same
or different days, with the intent of avoiding the filing of CTR's."'
The term "assist in structuring" has apparently created some concern on
the part of financial institutions. Some institutions evidently fear that they
may be liable for assisting in structuring if they handle multiple transactions
for a particular customer, without knowing that the transactions, once ag-
gregated, have exceeded $10,000, and the customer later proves to have been
structuring his transactions. Section 5324, however, does not proscribe inad-
vertent conduct that falls short of willfulness or negligence.61 In addition, a
financial institution that handles multiple currency transactions of $10,000
or less is not "assisting in structuring," for purposes of section 5324, if the
conduct of those transactions is for some purpose other than evasion of the
CTR reporting requirement.62
IV. SusPicious TRANSACTIONS: RECOGNITION AND REPORTING BY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Many financial institutions remain uncertain about the steps they should
56. H.R. REP. No. 746, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1986).
57. Id.
58. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986).
59. See 132 CONG. REC. H6558 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep. St Germain);
id. at H6560 (statement of Rep. Wylie); id. at H6599 (statement of Rep. Pickle).
60. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL Div., HANDBOOK ON THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE
ACT OF 1986, at 86 (1987) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
61. See 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5321(a)(4)(A), 5322(a) (West Supp. 1987).
62. See S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986).
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take if they handle currency transactions of $10,000 or less and are suspi-
cious that the transactions may be part of a structuring effort or money laun-
dering scheme. For some, the uncertainty may stem from lack of knowledge
about professional money laundering; for others, it may be colored by their
concern for customer relations.
In determining what constitutes a "suspicious transaction" (i.e., a transac-
tion that may involve an illegal activity, such as a BSA or money laundering
violation), one cannot use a single criterion that will definitively indicate a
connection between a financial transaction and an illegal activity. Law en-
forcement authorities and bank compliance experts have observed, however,
that the following acts are characteristic of persons conducting large cash
transactions who are seeking either to structure transactions to avoid the
CTR reporting requirement or to engage in money laundering:
1. The person seeks to exchange large amounts of small-denomination
bills (i.e., $1, $5, $10, and $20 bills) for large-denomination bills (i.e., $50
and $100 bills).
2. The person presents a transaction that involves large numbers of $50
and $100 bills.
3. The person presents the transaction without having counted the cash.
4. The person expresses concern about the financial institution's inten-
tion to file a CTR on the transaction.
5. The person, after being informed that the institution intends to file a
CTR on the transaction, seeks to take back part of the cash in order to
reduce the amount of the transaction to $10,000 or less.
6. The person, after being informed that the institution intends to file a
CTR on the transaction, asks the officer or employee handling the transac-
tion whether he should deposit less than $10,000.
7. The person initiates a transaction involving more than $10,000 in
cash, but appears reluctant to provide identification for the CTR even
though he has no account relationship with that institution.
8. The person conducts multiple transactions, each involving less than
$10,000, but totaling more than $10,000, over the course of several consecu-
tive or near-consecutive days (e.g., Monday, Wednesday, and Friday),
whether at the same financial institution, different branches of the same in-
stitution, or different institutions.
9. The person deposits multiple cashier's checks or money orders (each
for $10,000 or less) into an account from which funds are subsequently wire-
transferred to a foreign bank account or are otherwise withdrawn.
10. Two or more persons enter a financial institution together and sepa-
rately make cash purchases of monetary instruments (such as cashier's
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checks) that individually do not exceed $10,000, but that total more than
$10,000, from different tellers in the same institution.63
In recent months, financial institutions throughout the country have pro-
vided information to law enforcement authorities that included numerous
situations involving one or more of the factors listed above. The following
situations, drawn from this information, appear to involve violations of the
CTR reporting requirement or the structuring offense, and also may involve
other federal offenses:
1. Over a three-month period, numerous cash deposits totaling more
than $500,000 were made into the account of an import company. These
deposits were made through several branches and tellers of the bank, but no
individual deposit ever exceeded $10,000.
2. After depositing a check for $75,000 in a bank account, a customer
returned to the bank the following day and cashed one check for $9,500,
then attempted to cash a second check for $9,000. The next day, the person
cashed a check for $9,000 at the bank and attempted to cash a second check
for $9,500 at the same bank, then succeeded in cashing a $9,500 check at
another branch of the bank. The next day thereafter, the person cashed a
$9,875 check and attempted to cash another check for $8,000. At each bank
branch the person visited, the person gave a different explanation of the use
to which the cash would be put.
3. A customer opening a savings account told the new account clerk at
the institution that he did not want to have "one of those forms filled out,"
and that he had a lot of cash to deposit. The clerk then informed the cus-
tomer that the institution was required to complete a CTR if a deposit in-
volved more than $10,000. On six consecutive days thereafter, the customer
deposited a total of more than $36,000, all in $100 bills; all but two of the six
deposits were for exactly $9,000.
4. A person, who reported his occupation as "retired," made deposits of
$9,500 on multiple days. The deposits were separated into amounts of
$8,500 and $1,000, and divided between checking and savings accounts.
These deposits usually involved $50 and $100 bills.
5. A customer sought to deposit $14,000 in cash and a $6,000 check.
When the teller handling the transaction requested information to complete
a CTR, the customer asked whether she (the customer) could deposit $9,000
today and $5,000 tomorrow. When the teller said that she could not tell the
customer how to conduct her transaction, the customer deposited only the
check and left without depositing any of the cash. Later that day, the cus-
63. See United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1094-95 (1lth Cir. 1983).
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tomer deposited $7,000 in cash at a second branch of the bank and an addi-
tional $7,000 at a third branch of that bank.
6. During two consecutive days, three branches of a bank in a southern
state handled the purchases of thirteen cashier's checks totaling more than
$130,000 by a nondepositor who resided several hundred miles away. When
bank employees asked the purchaser for identification to complete CTR's on
the transactions, the person refused and left the branches. The checks were
subsequently deposited at another bank in the same state.
7. A person purchased with cash a number of $9,000 cashier's checks.
A subsequent purchase of a $6,000 cashier's check was made with $100 bills.
On the basis of this information, four actions should immediately be taken
whenever an officer, employee, director, or partner of a financial institution
encounters evidence of a suspicious cash transaction. First, that person
should immediately bring such information to the attention of the institu-
tion's compliance coordinator or other supervisor responsible for assuring
the institution's compliance with the BSA.64 Second, that supervisor should
follow the institution's internal procedures to determine whether the person
or persons who conducted the suspicious transaction also conducted other
currency transactions at that institution (including its branches) during the
same business day or over the course of several consecutive or near-consecu-
tive days. Third, if the institution finds that the person or persons conducted
more than $10,000 in currency transactions during the same business day, it
must complete a CTR and should submit that CTR to the IRS as soon as
possible. Fourth, whether or not the institution must file a CTR, it should
immediately contact the local IRS office to report the matter to a Special
Agent of the IRS Criminal Investigation Division.
These actions are wholly consistent with the CTR provisions of the regu-
lations. The regulations state that for purposes of CTR reporting,
"[m]ultiple currency transactions shall be treated as a single transaction if
the financial institution has knowledge that they are by or on behalf of any
person and result in either cash in or cash out totalling more than $10,000
64. Under regulations issued by five federal financial institutions supervisory agencies
(i.e., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, and the National Credit Union Administration), all financial institutions regulated by
those supervisory agencies must develop and provide for the continued administration of a
program reasonably designed to assure compliance with the BSA's recordkeeping and report-
ing requirements. Procedures for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, 52 Fed. Reg.
2858 (1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 21.21, 208.14, 326.8, 563.17-7, 748.2). Each of
these compliance programs must include the designation of an individual responsible for coor-
dinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance with the BSA's requirements. Id.
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during any one business day."' 65 The term "knowledge" in this statement
means more than a single individual's knowledge of multiple transactions.
The Treasury has stated that "knowledge" means "knowledge on the part of
a partner, director, officer or employee of a financial institution, or on the
part of any existing system at the institution that permits it to aggregate
transactions., 66 This statement clearly indicates that the Treasury will im-
pute to the financial institution any "knowledge" of multiple transactions
that are captured in a manual or automated system that the financial institu-
tion maintains to aid in tracing cash-in and cash-out transactions.
Equally important, the Treasury will apply the concept of "willful blind-
ness," a concept long recognized and accepted in criminal law for analysis of
criminal intent, 67 in determining whether a financial institution had suffi-
cient knowledge of multiple transactions to recognize its obligation to file a
CTR:
"Knowledge," as used in the final rule, clearly includes the concept
of "willful blindness" as well. This concept applies to a person
who has deliberately avoided positive knowledge; that is, "if a per-
son has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make
further inquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is
deemed to have knowledge." If a financial institution suspects
someone may be structuring transactions in order to avoid the fill-
ing out of a record or report, but deliberately refuses to ask ques-
tions because it wishes to remain ignorant and therefore,
"innocent," the financial institution will be deemed to have knowl-
edge for purposes of assessing liability under the Bank Secrecy
Act.
68
This view is consistent with the recent decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Bank of New England,
N.A.69 That decision affirmed the conviction of the Bank of New England
on thirty-one felony counts of failure to file CTR's on reportable currency
65. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1987). With respect to banks, the regulations further define
the term "business day," as "that day, as normally communicated to its depository customers
* . .on which a bank routinely posts a particular transaction to its customer's account." Id.
§ 103.11(q). A comparable requirement for CTRC reporting applies to multiple currency
transactions that "result in either cash in or cash out totalling more than $10,000 during any
twenty-four hour period." Id. § 103.22(a)(2).
66. Amendments to Implementing Regulations Under the Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed.
Reg. 11,436-37 (1987).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-04 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 951 (1976).
68. Amendments to Implementing Regulations Under the Bank Secrecy Act, supra note
66, at 11,437 (quoting Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700) (citations omitted)).
69. 821 F.2d 844 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
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transactions. 70 Applying the principle that a finding of willfulness for a BSA
conviction must be supported by proof of the defendant's knowledge of the
reporting requirements and his specific intent to commit the crime, the court
of appeals upheld the district court's use of jury instructions that permitted
the jury to ascribe to the bank the total knowledge of the bank's employees
acting within the scope of their employment.71 Under this "collective
knowledge" theory, the fact that an officer or employee of a financial institu-
tion, acting within the scope of his employment, showed awareness of the
CTR reporting requirements in considering whether to make further inquiry
about the suspicious transaction could clearly be imputed to the institution
itself.
Although the BSA does not compel a financial institution to report suspi-
cious transactions that do not exceed $10,000 when aggregated, a recent
amendment to the Right to Financial Privacy Act7 2 now provides clear au-
thority for a financial institution7" to report certain information about such
transactions without fear of civil liability under the Right to Financial Pri-
vacy Act for disclosure of a customer's financial records without notice to
the customer. Section 1103(c) of that Act, as amended, now states that
nothing in the Act:
shall preclude any financial institution, or any officer, employee, or
agent of a financial institution, from notifying a Government au-
thority that such institution, or officer, employee, or agent has in-
formation which may be relevant to a possible violation of any
statute or regulation. Such information may include only the name
or other identifying information concerning any individual or ac-
count involved in and the nature of any suspected illegal activity.74
The legislative history of the 1986 amendment clarifies the scope of this lan-
guage. The Senate Judiciary Committee report that dealt with the amend-
ment stated:
The name or names that may be disclosed under this section
includes the name of any corporate entity, partnership, or other
organization in which an account is listed, as well as the names, if
known, of any individuals involved in a suspected transaction.
Other identifying information that may be disclosed about individ-
70. Id. at 856-57.
71. Id. at 856.
72. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
73. The Right to Financial Privacy Act defines the term "financial institution" more nar-
rowly than does the BSA and the regulations thereunder. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 3401(1) (1982)
with 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1982), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2)(T) (West Supp.
1987) and 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(g) (1987).
74. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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uals includes the individual's home or business addresses or social
security number, if known.
Other identifying information that may be disclosed about ac-
counts includes, in addition to account number, the type of ac-
count (checking, savings, securities) or the interest rate paid on the
account. It also includes the location of the branch or office at
which the account is maintained.
The nature of suspected illegal activity that may be disclosed
includes a specification of the offense that the financial institution
believes is being violated, if known, or a description of the activities
giving rise to the bank's suspicions. Thus, for instance, if a cus-
tomer of a bank comes into the bank with regularity, every Mon-
day, Wednesday, and Friday, to obtain a cashier's check with
$5,000 in small denomination bills, the bank could describe this
pattern in the information it submits to law enforcement officials,
even if the bank does not know precisely what law might be
violated."
So long as a financial institution limits its voluntary disclosure to the catego-
ries of information listed above, section 1103(c) permits that disclosure,
notwithstanding any contrary provision in the laws of any state or local gov-
ernment. In addition, it unambiguously exempts that institution from liabil-
ity to the customer under federal, state, or local law for either the disclosure
or the failure to notify the customer of that disclosure.76
V. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Neither section 1103(c) nor the other provisions of the Right to Financial
Privacy Act require a financial institution to disclose information about a
suspicious transaction or transactions." However, financial institutions
should recognize that there are a number of substantial reasons for making
such disclosures voluntarily. One is the need for prompt disclosure to aid in
detecting and apprehending money launderers. As law enforcement officials
throughout the country are aware, the hirelings of professional money laun-
derers are likely to visit numerous financial institutions in the same geo-
graphic area for a brief duration, and then move on to other areas before
they are recognized and apprehended by law enforcement authorities. If a
financial institution does not promptly pass on its suspicions about such cus-
tomers to the authorities, it will be far more difficult to apprehend them and
disrupt the money laundering operation.
75. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
77. See HANDBOOK, supra note 60, at 88; L. FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRI-
VACY § 2.05(2)(c), at 2-57 (1983).
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For this reason, Francis A. Keating, II, the Assistant Secretary for En-
forcement at the Treasury, has frequently urged financial institutions to be
"good citizens" and report all BSA violations promptly to the appropriate
federal agencies.7 8 Similarly, in its report on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that it "strongly encourages
financial institutions to assist law enforcement efforts by providing such vol-
untary disclosure wherever they legitimately suspect illegal activity, consis-
tent with the privacy rights of their customers."7 9 The Committee also
expressed the hope that all financial institutions would "establish a formal
policy that encourages their officers and employees to report illegal activities
promptly."8 °
Moreover, if a possible structured transaction arouses the suspicions of an
officer or employee of a financial institution, but that officer or employee fails
to make further inquiry regarding the transaction or to bring it to the atten-
tion of law enforcement authorities, those facts may later constitute evidence
of the institution's intent to violate the BSA. In Bank of New England the
First Circuit upheld not only the so-called "collective knowledge" instruc-
tion, but also another portion of the jury instructions that permitted an infer-
ence of specific intent from evidence of the bank's flagrant indifference to its
obligations under the BSA.8 1 It cited with approval the United States
Supreme Court's definition of willfulness, "in both civil and criminal con-
texts, as 'a disregard for the governing statute and an indifference to its
requirements.' "82
Under that holding, evidence that the officer or employee had considered
the amount and nature of the suspicious transaction, but made no further
inquiry about the possibility that it was part of a series of transactions that
had to be aggregated and reported, could be considered probative of the in-
stitution's flagrant indifference to its CTR reporting obligations. As the
court noted in Bank of New England:
Given the suspicions aroused by [the customer's] banking practices
and the abundance of information indicating that his transactions
were [structured and, therefore,] reportable, the jury could have
concluded that the failure by Bank personnel to, at least, inquire
about the reportability of [the customer's] transactions constituted
78. See Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 33, at 25 (statement of Francis A. Keat-
ing, II, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury).
79. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986).
80. Id. at 15-16.
81. 821 F.2d 844, 856-57 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
82. Id. at 856 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 127 & n.20
(1985)).
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flagrant indifference to the obligations imposed by the Act.83
Particularly if a court found that the institution in question had trained
the officer or employee on BSA requirements, and was responsible for ad-
ministering a program for compliance with the BSA, that court might con-
clude that the officer or employee had disregarded the BSA "without making
any reasonable effort to determine whether the plan he [was] following
would constitute a violation of the law."84 In contrast, it would appear that
efforts by the institution to bring the suspicious transaction promptly to the
authorities' attention, after determining whether a CTR had to be filed on
that and other transactions, would tend to indicate that the institution
lacked specific intent to violate the BSA.
In Bank of New England, the court of appeals also upheld a third portion
of the jury instructions that deemed evidence of the bank's conduct after its
final CTR violation to be probative of the bank's mental state.8" The court
noted that the conduct "could be found to show scant effort by the [b]ank to
comply with its legal obligations, even after it had learned that [the cus-
tomer] had come under suspicion."8 6 Relying upon Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b), 87 the court permitted the introduction of that evidence as
manifesting the bank's disregard of its reporting duty.8 8 Under this holding,
evidence that a financial institution failed to take any action to bring the
suspicious transaction to the authorities' attention could constitute evidence
of the requisite mental state in a BSA prosecution. Prompt reporting of the
institution's suspicions, however, could aid the institution in demonstrating
its lack of intent to violate the BSA, so long as the institution also promptly
determined whether it needed to file a CTR pertaining to that transaction.
Although the foregoing comments pertain to the possible use of evidence
in BSA prosecutions, such evidence could also be relevant in prosecutions
for other federal criminal offenses, such as aiding, abetting, or causing
the commission of a federal offense,8 9 serving as an accessory after the
83. Id. at 857.
84. Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 4,79 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
876 (1951). The Supreme Court indicated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S.
111 (1985), that this definition of "willful" was consistent with the Court's interpretations of
that term in other criminal and civil statutes. Id. at 126.
85. 821 F.2d at 859.
86. Id. at 858.
87. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The rule states that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts" may be admissible "as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Id.
88. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 858-59.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The aiding and abetting offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), generally
would require proof that the "defendant had associated himself with a criminal venture, partic-
ipated in it as something he wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it
19881
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fact,90 misprision of a federal felony,9' conspiracy to defraud the United
States,92 concealment of material facts from a federal agency,93 or money
laundering.94 In addition, such evidence would clearly be relevant in the
Treasury's decision whether to impose a civil penalty against a financial in-
stitution for civil violations of the BSA, such as willful failures to file CTR's
or assistance in structuring transactions.
A further consideration, for some financial institutions, in making volun-
tary disclosures of suspicious transactions to law enforcement agencies is the
succeed." United States v. Bryant, 671 F.2d 450, 454 (1 1th Cir. 1982); see also, e.g., Nye &
Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) (citing United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,
402 (2d Cir. 1938) (L. Hand, J.)). The "causing" offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), has frequently been
used against officers or employees of financial institutions for causing their institutions to fail
to file CTRs. See United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 790-93 (2d Cir. 1986); United States
v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200, 1204 (5th Cir. 1979).
90. 18 U.S.C § 3 (1982). Courts define an accessory after the fact as "one who, knowing
that a crime has been committed, obstructs justice by giving comfort or assistance to the of-
fender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension or punishment." Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 553 (3d Cir. 1967); see also United States v. Barlow,
470 'F.2d 1245, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1972). A bank officer or employee, like other persons,
could be convicted as an accessory after the fact to a BSA violation even though he was present
before, during, and after the crime. See Smith v. United States, 306 F.2d 286, 286-87 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). This offense generally would require proof that the principal
had committed and completed the felony alleged, and that the defendant had full knowledge of
that fact but failed to notify the authorities and took an affirmative step to conceal the princi-
pal's crime. See, e.g., United States v. Ciambrone, 750 F.2d 1416, 1417 (9th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Baez, 732 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1984). Mere silence, without some affirmative
step, would not suffice as evidence of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d
674, 675 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515, 517 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 281 U.S. 624 (1930).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). Under this statute, courts have convicted persons for con-
ducting currency transactions that thwart the government's ability to obtain information con-
cerning currency transactions of more than $10,000. See, e.g., United States v. Konstantinov,
793 F.2d 1296, 1296 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 191 (1986); United States v. Giancola,
783 F.2d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 669 (1986); United States v. Shearson
Lehman Bros., 650 F. Supp. 490, 493-94, 497-500 (E.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. Richter,
610 F. Supp. 480, 487 (N.D. I11. 1985), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mangovski, 785 F.2d
312, 312 (7th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 896-97 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983). In contrast to the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1982), which the Supreme Court recently construed to extend only to the protection of
money or property rights, McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2880-81 (1987), the term
"defraud" in § 371 reaches any conspiracy to impair, obstruct, or defeat the lawful function of
any department of government. See Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2751-52 (1987);
United States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50, 58 (5th Cir. 1987).
93. '18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). Some courts have upheld convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1982) for conspiracy to violate § 1001 by causing a bank to conceal material facts from the
government concerning currency transactions. See United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294,
1309-15 (2d Cir. 1987); Richter, 610 F. Supp. at 486-87.
94. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (Supp. IV 1986).
[Vol. 37:465
Observations On The Bank Secrecy Act
possibility that its federal supervisory agency may require it to report possi-
ble BSA violations. Five of the federal financial institutions supervisory
agencies-the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the National
Credit Union Administration-have endorsed and implemented the concept
of a standard form for reporting possible criminal violations to United States
Attorneys, federal investigative agencies, and the supervisory agencies.
These forms, known as Criminal Referral Forms, specifically include the
BSA among the federal criminal statutes appropriate for reporting on the
forms.95 Both the OCC and the FDIC have specifically revised their regula-
tions to require the institutions under their supervision to use these forms in
reporting federal criminal violations.96
VI. CONCLUSION
Financial institutions, like other United States citizens, have "a deeply
rooted social obligation" 97 to report felonies to the authorities-in common-
law parlance, to raise the "hue and cry." 98 That obligation is particularly
compelling in cases of money laundering and BSA violations, where the gov-
ernment's success in detecting and apprehending criminals is often depen-
95. See, e.g., Criminal Referral Form (Short Form), OCC Form CC-8010-08, at 5 (1986
ed.); Criminal Referral Form, Federal Reserve Form FR 2230, at 6 (1986 ed.); Report of
Apparent Crime (Short Form), FDIC Form 6710/06, at 4 (1986 ed.), reprinted in Reports of
Apparent Crimes Affecting Insured Nonmember Banks, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,485, 16,491 (1986).
96. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (1987); id. § 353.0-.1. Other agencies have not issuedsuch
regulations to date. For explanations of the standards that financial institutions are expected
to apply in deciding whether to use the forms, see Interpretive Rulings and Minimum Security
Devices and Procedures and Reports of Crimes and Suspected Crimes, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,866
(1986) (OCC regulations); Reports of Apparent Crimes Affecting Insured Nonmember Banks,
51 Fed. Reg. 16,485 (1986).
97. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980).
98. English common law required every man who discovered a felony to raise the "hue
and cry," and thereby summon his neighbors to assist in overtaking the felon. 2 F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 578-79 (2d ed. 1923); see also, e.g., Roberts,
445 U.S. at 557. Sir William Holdsworth traced the antecedents of this requirement to the
Assize of Arms in 1181, and (in ruder form) even to Anglo-Saxon law. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 294 (7th ed. rev. 1956); 2 id. at 80, 101-02, 111 (3d ed. rev. 1923);
3 id. at 309, 599, 600, 603; 4 id. 521 (1924); see also C. LOWELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
AND LEGAL HISTORY 40-41 (1962).
The hue and cry requirement arose from the practical necessity of ensuring that felons could
be brought to justice in areas where law enforcement authorities were not immediately avail-
able. Under the common-law approach, failure to raise the "hue" after discovering the crime
could itself constitute an offense. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra, at 578. Long after
government assumed the primary responsibility to detect and prosecute felons, the duty to
raise the hue and cry and report felonies to the authorities has remained a "deeply rooted
social obligation" in this country. Roberts, 445 U.S. at 558; United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d
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dent on the speed with which financial institutions bring suspicious
transactions to its attention.99 To deal with such cases, financial institutions
can raise the "hue and cry" most effectively through full compliance with
the BSA's reporting requirements and by frequent use of the legal authority
for voluntary disclosures to law enforcement agencies.
Cooperation between the financial community and the law enforcement
community on such matters, however, must be mutual and enduring. The
Treasury's commitment to improving that cooperation has been demon-
strated by its initiation of a process for promulgating formal administrative
rulings on BSA issues,ioo and by its exploration of methods to make the
filing of BSA reports less onerous for financial institutions.11 Continued
cooperation between financial institutions and law enforcement agencies will
help to ensure that the BSA will have lasting value for detecting financial
crimes.
389, 392 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972); Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
That obligation, of course, is not legally enforceable for every type of felony in American
law. As Chief Justice Marshall once stated, "the law which would punish [the citizen] in every
case, for not performing this duty is too harsh for man." Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 251, 260 (1822).
99. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
100. See Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Instituting an Administrative Ruling Sys-
tem, 52 Fed. Reg. 35,545 (1987) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.70-.77). This system will
allow the Treasury to issue formal interpretations of the regulations, either on its own initiative
or in response to specific inquiries from the public. See id. Through this system, the Treasury
seeks "to ensure uniformity of advice and the effective and efficient dissemination of Treasury
interpretations throughout the affected financial community." Id. at 35,546.
101. In March 1987, the Treasury initiated a pilot program to enable financial institutions
to file CTR data on magnetic tape rather than paper forms. See Bank Secrecy Act; Electronic
Filing of Currency Transaction Reports, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,183 (1987). For institutions that
have automated systems to record data on their financial transactions, this program may ap-
preciably reduce the time and expense associated with preparing and filing large numbers of
CTR's. More recently, the Treasury amended its regulation on disclosure of BSA reports,
which, inter alia, clarifies its authority to disclose CTR data periodically to states that have
enacted laws similar to the BSA. See Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regarding Disclo-
sure of Bank Secrecy Act Data, 52 Fed. Reg. 35,544 (1987) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.43). Periodic sharing of these data can spare not only a state form processing these
reports independently, but also the financial institutions in that state from submitting duplicate
or comparable forms to the state. Id.
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